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Containing communism was the justification for the coup, but by the coldest reckoning the price was excessive. The Shah's legitimacy was irreparably compromised by owing his throne to Washington. It is a reasonable argument that but for the coup Iran now would be a mature democracy. So traumatic was the coup's legacy that when the Shah finally departed in 1979, many Iranians feared a repetition of 1953, which was one of the motives for the student seizure of the U.S. embassy. The hostage crisis, in turn, precipitated the Iraqi invasion of Iran, while the revolution itself played a part in the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan. A lot of history, in short, flowed from a single week in Tehran. What changed Washington's position? There are different hypotheses. Some argue that the primary motive was the desire to advance the interests of U.S. oil companies by gaining them a share in Iran's oil industry. Before the coup, it was claimed that a "big deal" had been struck between British and U.S. oil companies to divide up Iranian oil. In fact, an agreement announced after the coup gave U.S. firms a 40 percent share of Iran's petroleum output, which previously had been exclusively controlled by the British. The Eisenhower team was avowedly pro-business, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen, the director of central intelligence, had been prominent Wall Street lawyers specializing in international business. Given the strategic importance of oil in the aftermath of the Second World War, the commercial motivation theory is a plausible one.
Against the theory is the fact that it ignores the contemporary realities of the international oil market. Since a glut already existed in the early 1950s, U.S. companies had no compelling reason to seek new sources. The U.S. "majors" had increased output in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, more than compensating for the loss of Iranian oil. Their operating in Iran would have forced them to reduce production elsewhere, potentially creating tensions with the Saudis and Kuwaitis. Furthermore, the intense nationalism in Iran made operations there seem risky. For these reasons, U.S. oil executives repeatedly told Washington officials that they were not interested in Iranian oil. At one point, to counter this lack of interest, the Truman administration even tried to persuade U.S. companies to take part in an Iranian oil consortium by offering to scale back a major antitrust suit the Justice Department had brought against them.
Besides, the timing of the initial U.S. approval of the plan to overthrow Mossadeq -two weeks after Eisenhower's inauguration -suggests that the initiative was due more to the new team's activist foreign policy views than to commercial opportunities. The coup was in fact something of a test of the administration's new strategy for combating Soviet expansionism. During the 1952 election campaign, Republicans had accused the Truman administration of dealing ineffectively with communism, arguing that Democrats had "lost" China and Eastern Europe, and had become bogged down in a seemingly endless war in Korea. Once in power, the Eisenhower team began to formulate a new global strategy, which became known as the "New Look." The strategy sought to retain the Truman defense policies while acting more aggressively and using a wider variety of initiatives against communist adversaries. After the success of the Iran coup in August 1953, marking America's first use of covert means to overthrow a foreign government, the United States undertook similar efforts in Guatemala, Egypt, Syria, Indonesia, and Cuba.
Washington's decision to involve itself in Iran was shaped by historical experience. In violation of agreements made during the Second World War, Soviet troops had remained in Iran after the war. This began to fuel an internal debate about Soviet intentions, and although Moscow pulled back its forces from northern Iran in 1946, this did not assuage U.S. fears of ultimate Soviet intentions.
The Consequences
The most significant consequence of the 1953 coup, a drama that reached its climax in a week that saw the Shah flee from Tehran, and then return when orchestrated demonstrations brought down Mossadeq, was its impact on Iran's domestic politics. In the coup's immediate aftermath, the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi put in place a rigid authoritarian regime that banned all forms of opposition. In an attempt to bolster royal legitimacy, the Shah in the early 1960s launched his "White Revolution." The introduction of mass mobilization in the fascist style marked a new chapter in Iranian politics. To portray himself as a progressive, the Shah embarked on a land reform program -the centerpiece of his White Revolution -that eliminated almost all of Iran's large landowners, thereby essentially destroying the traditional upper class, economically and politically. Unfortunately, land reform, together with Iran's rapid economic growth, led many Iranian peasants to migrate to urban areas, swelling the ranks of an urban lower class, setting the stage for future events.
The White Revolution was also a testcase for the new Shia leadership among the dominant Islamic clergy. It was during the 1960s that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whom the Shah initially labeled as "fanatic and backward," emerged as a powerful dissenting voice. It is true that the ayatollah saw aspects of the Shah's program as potentially corrupting, but did this mean he was against rural development or empowering women? As to the latter, the ayatollah responded with an ironic question, "Are the men free now that the Shah wants to free women?" More importantly, his was an expression of indigenous religious nationalism in reaction to the increasing incorporation of Iran into the Western political and economic system under the authoritarian aegis of the Shah.
In October Such was to be our fate again, we were convinced, and it was to be irreversible. We now had to reverse the irreversible." The common belief among many Iranians was that the American hostages were held partly as a guarantee that Washington would not repeat its past mischief.
Second, a war between Iraq and Iran, one of the longest and bloodiest wars in the modern era, a war in which for the first time chemical gas was directed massively against civilians, as well as combatants, began in 1980, the first period of Iran's Islamic Revolution. An obvious motive for Iraq's aggression, though never declared, was Baghdad's fear that Iran's Shia would serve as a revolutionary example for Iraq. Whatever the motives of Iraq's aggression, the event was momentous for the region as a whole, highlighting the military ambitions and irredentist designs of the Baghdad regime -something the world would come to discover when Iraq tried to annex Kuwait ten years later. And yet Washington covertly helped the Iraqi regime during its war with Iran, sharing intelligence information with what it now terms a "rogue state" aligned in an "axis of evil" with, of all countries, Iran.
And third, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been similarly pivotal. Regardless of the strategic goals of the Soviet Union at the time, the revolution in Iran provided Moscow with an excuse to involve itself in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. It was widely believed then, and corroborated in memoirs and by the release of once- 
